But the National Institutes of Health never told the White House about problems it found in 
2002 with its research on the drug nevirapine before President Bush unveiled a 500 million
plan to distribute the medicine across Africa, documents obtained by The Associated Press
show. 
Instead, officials inside the government's premier health research agency scrambled to keep
its safety experts' concerns from scuttling the use of nevirapine in Africa as a cheap
solution to stopping babies from getting AIDS from infected mothers, the memos show. 
Everyone recognized the enormity that this decision could have on the worldwide use of  
nevirapine to interrupt mother-baby transmission, NIH's AIDS research chief, Dr. Edmund C.
Tramont, reported March 14, 2002, to his boss, Anthony Fauci, director of the National
Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases. 
Since then, hundreds of thousand of doses of the drug have been administered to African
mothers and babies under the Bush plan. 
Up to half those babies may have been stopped from getting AIDS, officials said. But now
concerns are emerging about whether patients who received those single doses have developed
resistance to further AIDS treatment. 
The documents show Tramont and other NIH officials dismissed the problems with the nevirapine
research in Uganda as overblown and were slow to report safety concerns to the Food and Drug
Administration. 
A professional auditor hired by NIH who first helped disclose the problems said in an
interview that most of the problems were fixable but NIH officials were in a rush to declare
that things were OK. 
It seemed to me we were drawing conclusions too quickly across the board, especially the
implementation of nevirapine in South Africa, auditor Michael Hensley told AP. 
Ultimately, NIH did stop the Uganda research for 15 months -- from the spring of 2002 to the
summer of 2003 -- to review the science and take corrective actions. 
NIH officials told AP they remain confident after re-reviewing the Uganda study and other
research that nevirapine can be used safely in single doses by African mothers and children
to prevent HIV transmission during birth. 
But they acknowledged their Uganda research failed to meet required U.S. standards and have
asked the National Academy of Sciences to investigate. 
I would say there are many lessons that we have learned from this review that will help us
do our clinical research, both domestically and internationally, much better, said Dr. H.
Clifford Lane, NIH's No. 2 infectious disease official. 
The White House said it remains confident in Bush's 500 million plan in 2002 to send
nevirapine to Africa, a continent that accounts for more than two-thirds of the world's AIDS
cases, with 27 million people infected. The United States approved 2.9 billion to fight
global AIDS in 2005. 
The president's mission is to try to stop the spread of AIDS in Africa and to come at it
from a new angle, and that is what this is all about, spokesman Trent Duffy said. 
Though the White House was never told of the problems, they were serious enough that the U.S.
Health and Human Services Department sent a nine-page letter to Ugandan officials identifying
violations of federal patient protection rules by NIH's research. 
The NIH research may have represented a failure to minimize risk to the subjects, the
Office of Human Research Protections told Ugandan authorities in summer 2002, a month after
Bush's announcement of the nevirapine announcement. NIH officials said a recent closer review of the Uganda research has identified a new concern
-- that even single doses of nevirapine can create instant resistance. That means patients
may not be able to use the drug or others in its class again when their AIDS worsens, Lane
said. 
It was unexpected, and what it means is nevirapine probably shouldn't be a drug of first
choice if other options are available, Lane said. 
Lane said NIH officials were aware in spring 2002 of the impending White House announcement
on nevirapine but did not tell presidential aides of the problems because they were
confident, even before reviewing the Uganda research, that the underlying science was solid.
In order to reconstruct the research to make sure the science held up, NIH officials in
summer 2002 found they couldn't use patient records because of sloppy record keeping and
missing files. Instead, they had to review blood samples to determine which patients got the
medicines. 
Nevirapine is an antiretroviral drug marketed in the United States as Viramune. It has been
used since the 1990s to treat adult AIDS patients and is known to have potentially lethal
side effects like liver damage and severe rashes when taken over time. 
In 1997, NIH began studying in Uganda whether it could be given safely in single doses to
stop mother-to-baby HIV transmission. That research showed it could reduce transmission in as
many as half the births. 
But by early 2002, an NIH auditor, the agency's medical safety experts and the drug's maker
all disclosed widespread problems about the U.S.-funded research in Uganda. 
Boehringer Ingelheim, the Connecticut-based company that makes nevirapine, told NIH it
identified at least one critical compliance issue that compromised the integrity of the
study and more than four dozen issues it described as serious and major. 
Boehringer and NIH auditors cited concerns such as failing to get patients' consent about
changes in the experiment, administering wrong doses and delays and underreporting of fatal
and life threatening problems. 
It appeared likely, in fact, that many adverse events and perhaps a significant number of
serious adverse events for both mother and infant may not have been collected or reported in
a timely manner, Westat Corp. found in March 2002. Westat is a medical auditing firm hired
by NIH to visit and audit the Uganda site. 
Westat reported there were 14 deaths not reported in the study database as of early 2002 and
that the top two researchers in Uganda acknowledged thousands of bad reactions that weren't
disclosed. NIH said the subsequent review whittled that list down significantly, all deaths were
eventually recorded and the majority of bad reactions are believed to have been caused by the
poor health of patients, not the single dose of nevirapine. But they conceded it was
incumbent on a U.S. research project to disclose them fully and quickly. 
Officials said the problems began when NIH converted the research from determining the drug's
usefulness to supporting FDA approval for the drug. Paperwork in Uganda wasn't kept to FDA
standards, they said. 
We may not have reported exhaustively, but we reported all serious side effects, said
Professor Francis Mmiro, a lead doctor in the Uganda study. What you may call a serious side
effect in the U.S. is not a serious side effect in Kampala. 
NIH officials reviewed the bad news in early March 2002. 
Meeting minutes, written in shorthand, raised broad concerns: Half the babies in the study
were also enrolled in a vitamin A study that could have affected the outcome, and medical
staff running the trials didn't follow procedures for divulging serious adverse events
(SAEs). 
No mtg minutes, no training doc(umentation), site used their own criteria for grading SAEs.
No lab normal values & serious underreporting of SAEs, the minutes stated. 
They also quote an NIH official who visited Uganda as saying, The site staff doesn't know
what they don't know. 
But Tramont, the AIDS research chief, and other top NIH officials repeatedly dismissed the
concerns as preliminary or overblown, and sought to salvage the flawed research's underlying
conclusions rather than start over. 
There is presently no evidence that the study's scientific results are invalid, said a
report Tramont sent to his staff less than two weeks after getting the March 2002 Westat
audit. 
In January 2002, Boehringer had sent NIH an early copy of its report. But the drug maker,
fearing publicity about the report might destroy its chance to get FDA approval of the drug
for domestic use, asked NIH to destroy it before FDA regulators could learn about it. 
Sensitive information. Asked for it to be destroyed when audit is upon us, NIH official
Mary Anne Luzar wrote on the cover page of Boehringer's report. 
But Boehringer says it never requested the document be destroyed, saying our actions
throughout the study evaluation were proactive and forthcoming. 
Lane said the request to destroy the report was inappropriate and NIH never complied. But he
conceded his agency inappropriately kept the audit from FDA for weeks, saying, It shouldn't
have happened that way. 
NIH at first sought to postpone the FDA review of nevirapine, then top NIH and FDA officials
arranged for the drug maker to pull its U.S. application rather than risk a public rejection
that might scare African countries looking for U.S. guidance on the drug. 
Unaware of the internal NIH concerns, Bush announced in June 2002 the 500 million effort to
fight the spread of AIDS in Africa and the Caribbean. The plan's centerpiece was nevirapine. 
This major commitment of my government to prevent mother-to-child HIV transmission is the
first of this scale by any government, anywhere, Bush said in a Rose Garden announcement. 
African health officials are having second thoughts. South African officials in July
recommended ending the single-use treatment because of the new concerns about drug
resistance. 
African doctors said they weren't aware of the full extent of NIH's concerns but feel
comfortable -- at least until better options emerge -- administering it in single doses to
AIDS-sickened mothers who have few other choices to protect newborns. 
It's not ideal, but it works, said Dr. Ashraf Coovadia of Coronation Mother and Child
Hospital in Johannesburg, South Africa. Without it, many, many more babies would be born
with HIV. 
Boehringer Ingelheim said it has donated enough doses to treat more than 411,000 mothers and
infants in Africa, and self disclosed the problems it found with the Uganda research. But it
says it has research from other locations, like Thailand and South Africa, showing single
dose usage at birth is safe and effective. 
The bottom line is there were these procedural issues, such as the speed of reporting
adverse events, and the like. But the important scientific data was intact, and found to be
valid, said Dr. Patrick Robinson, a top Boehringer AIDS specialist. 
Still, the German-owned company is no longer seeking FDA permission in 2004 to use nevirapine
for protecting U.S. infants because better treatments have emerged, he said. (Source:
Associated Press, Via The Push Journal)
//// Links  
On the Net: 
Documents gathered by AP for this story http://wid.ap.org/nevirapine1.html 
National Institutes of Health: http://www.nih.gov 
Boehringer Ingelheim: http://www.boehringer-ingelheim.com 
Link to other articles
Research Flawed on Key AIDS Medicine - Washington Post
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A62360-2004Dec13.html